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OMRI BEN-SHAHAR*
Law and Economics, University of Michigan
This paper develops a framework to study the effects of the durability of legal allocation decisions, such 
as trial outcomes, regulatory enactments and property entitlements. For a party favored by the legal 
allocation, a more durable decision is also more costly to secure, ex ante. Thus, it is not the greater 
durability of the allocation that determines whether the “winner” is better off, but other factors that are 
affected by the durability attribute, such as the cost of securing a favorable outcome and the ability of 
contesting parties to affect this cost. The paper develops conditions under which greater durability is 
irrelevant, or even undesirable to the winner. The analysis is applied to shed light on durability 
doctrines relating to trial outcomes (e.g., res judicata and double jeopardy), rules and regulations (e.g., 
transition relief when rules change), entitlements (e.g., adverse possession and statutes of limitations), 
and marriages. 
1.INTRODUCTION
This essay studies the incentive effects of the durability of legal “allocation 
decisions”--all forms of legal decisions, government policies and regulations, 
allocations of property entitlements, contractual rights, marriages, and the like, 
that distribute value between individuals. An allocation decision can be 
characterized by its content and by its durability. The content of an allocation 
decision describes the relative value that each of the contestants receives. The 
durability of an allocation decision describes the length of time that the 
allocation is expected to last. Allocation decisions may be more (or less) 
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durable, depending on the difficulty (or ease) with which they can be revisited 
and changed. Here are a few examples of durability doctrines in the law: 
 Durability of Government Policies: Government policies can be more or less 
durable depending on the ease with which these policies can be modified or 
revoked by the government at a later stage. For example, rules determining the 
retroactive scope of new laws affect the durability of old laws. If the 
government may change the tax or zoning rules retroactively without 
compensating the losers, the original policy is less durable. The costlier the 
compensation requirement burdening a government seeking the transition, the 
more durable is the original policy. Or, if budgetary allocations expire 
periodically, they are less durable than spending programs that remain in effect 
until repealed, which in turn are less durable than spending programs that 
cannot be repealed.  
 Durability of Trial Outcomes: Adjudication decisions by courts (including both 
factual determinations and legal holdings) can be more or less durable 
depending on doctrines such as res judicata, double jeopardy, collateral 
estoppel, stare decisis, the appeals process, and the criteria for a new trial. Each 
of these doctrines determines, in its domain, the ability or the power to revisit 
the content of the initial decision and to change it at a later date. The more 
difficult it is to revisit and modify the original adjudicatory decision, the more 
durable the decision. 
 Durability of Statutes and Regulation: Legislative and other regulatory 
enactments are more or less durable depending on the constitutional rules 
governing the power of courts to review these enactments, erode them or add 
on to them. For example, if a firm’s compliance with federal safety or 
disclosure regulation fully preempts federal or state courts from imposing  
liability in torts on the firm, the regulation (or, more precisely, the benefit 
allocated to the party who complies with the regulation) is more durable. 
Similarly, the readiness with which constitutional courts apply judicial review 
and overturn statutes affects the durability of the statutes and of the 
entitlements they allocate. 
 Durability of Under-Protected Entitlements: Individuals’ legal entitlements are 
often violated repeatedly without much immediate enforcement action taken  
by the owners. Entitlements are more durable if the owner can maintain formal 
ownership (and subsequently file a legal claim) even after failing to 
affirmatively enforce against infringements in the past. Doctrines like estoppel, 
adverse possession, waiver, and course of performance, which erode 
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entitlements when violations are under-enforced, effectively diminish the 
durability of entitlements. 
 Durability of Contracts: Contractual rights are more durable the greater is the 
compensation to which the promisee is entitled in the event of breach. 
Government contracts, for example, are less durable if the government can 
breach without paying damages. In general, the closer the level of damages is to 
making the aggrieved party’s expectation interest whole, the more durable is 
the contractual promise. 
 Durability of Marriages: Marriages are more durable the more difficult it is to 
get a divorce. A no-fault divorce regime, for example, makes the marriage less 
durable. 
This paper develops a framework to analyze these seemingly unrelated 
durability doctrines in a unified manner. It demonstrates that a similar incentive 
structure describes the behavior of rational parties competing under these 
allocation procedures. Using an economic model of rent-seeking, the paper 
demonstrates some of the ways in which the durability of the outcome affects 
the relative well-being of the parties involved in the allocation contest. The 
paper also demonstrates an important way, often unrecognized by legal 
scholars studying individual durability doctrines, in which durability does not
affect the well-being of the contesting parties. 
A common intuition often stated in the legal analysis of durability doctrines is 
the following: a party pursuing a favorable outcome—be it a budgetary 
allocation, an acquittal at trial, a government contract, a secure marriage, or an 
endowment of property—will prefer the emerging allocation to be more, rather 
than less, durable. From an ex post perspective, this logic is sound: other things 
equal, the “winner” would prefer a lasting, rather than a temporary, victory. 
Other things, however, are not equal. From an ex ante perspective, the more 
durable an allocation is, the more difficult it is to acquire. A victory is sweeter if 
it lasts, but if it lasts it is less likely to arise. Because the allocation is the result 
of a “contest” between parties with conflicting interests, it is plausible that the 
competing parties will invest more rent-seeking effort when the contested 
allocation is more durable. Thus, ex ante, because of the increased stakes, a 
party might find it more difficult to secure a favorable outcome. In some 
settings, it will be shown, this ex ante effect of durability completely offsets the 
ex post gain, in which case the overall value enjoyed by each party is independent of the 
durability of the allocation decision. In fact, in these settings the only element that 
matters for the distribution of value is the relative effectiveness of each party’s 
rent-seeking “capital.” 
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The “flavor” of the intuition can be captured, although not accurately, by an 
example relating to the durability of goods, where the ex ante effect is more 
intuitively familiar. An electric battery, for example, can be more or less 
durable, depending on how long it can make the flashlight run. Other things 
equal, purchasing a more durable battery is beneficial because of the added 
operation time. But other things are not equal: purchasing a more durable 
battery would likely be more expensive, in terms of the price charged. Would 
you, the consumer-beneficiary, prefer a more durable or a less durable battery? 
If the producer’s marginal cost of increasing the durability is linear, and if you 
the consumer have perfect information and liquidity, zero transactions costs 
and no discounting, you would probably be indifferent between buying one 
durable battery or two half-as-durable batteries (assuming that the price is 
competitive and reflects marginal cost.) The price of each package would, 
under these sterile conditions, be the same, in terms of money and other 
transactions costs incurred. With batteries, as with allocation decisions, the 
more durable object provides more value, but at the same time it is 
proportionally more expensive to acquire. 
The formal analysis demonstrates the scope—and the limits—of this 
“neutrality-of-durability” intuition. It studies a set of assumptions under which 
some rules of durability do not matter to the contesting parties, and identifies 
situations in which durability does matter. This theoretical framework is then 
applied to re-examine various durability doctrines, with the goal being to 
explain why it has often been conjectured in the vast literatures dealing with 
each of these doctrines, that the doctrines may have an important distributive 
effect. For each of these doctrines, the analysis identifies one or more of the 
features highlighted by the model, dealing mainly with the costs and returns to 
rent-seeking effort, that explain the effect of durability. It is these features, and 
not the durability property per se, that are responsible for any distributive 
effect that durability doctrines might have. Again, in reference to the battery 
metaphor, the consumer would prefer a durable battery if she wants to save the 
transaction costs of repeatedly purchasing many short-lived batteries, or if the 
marginal cost of increased durability declines; but the consumer will prefer the 
short-lived batteries if she is liquidity constrained, or if she is unsure about her 
long-term need for battery power. It is not the durability alone, but rather the 
effect of the durability property on the broadly-defined transactions costs, that 
can explain the preference. 
Thus, the contribution of this essay is primarily methodological. First, by 
unifying the framework underlying various doctrines, the analysis highlights 
that what appear to be unrelated problems, gathered from unrelated areas of 
life and the law, in fact share a common structure, which in turn permits them 
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to be cross-referenced, their rationales to be shared and compared, and, 
eventually, to economize on interpretive effort. Second, the analytical structure 
developed here highlights the type of factors that ought to be explored for the 
purpose of understanding the effect of legal durability.2 The problems with this 
approach are on the one hand the lack of nuance in tailoring the model to the 
different realities it captures, and, on the other hand, the compromises in the 
modeling structure that are required to unify similar but not identical situations. 
Accordingly, this study is but a first step in what can eventually be a more 
refined and analytically rich formal study of legal durability. 
2.MODEL
2.1.FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Two risk neutral parties, denoted by A and B, compete over a zero-sum 
allocation decision. Let W denote the value of the allocation to party A. There 
are two periods (t = 1,2) and the allocation W can potentially vary across 
periods. Denote by (W1, W2) the allocation decisions in the two periods. The 
initial, pre-contest baseline is denoted by W0. That is, in the absence of any 
effort by the parties to affect the allocation (rent-seeking), party A will enjoy a 
value of W0 and party B will have 0 in period 1 and 2. W0 can represent, for 
example, an initial bias of the decision maker, a legal presumption in favor of 
one party, or an initial entitlement. Denote by x and y the total expenditures by 
parties A and B, respectively, on influencing the outcome. The parties can 
potentially divide their efforts across the two periods, thus denote by (x1, x2)
the expenditures of party A and similarly (y1, y2) for party B, with x = x1 + x2
and y = y1 + y2. The effect of the parties’ rent-seeking actions on the resulting 
allocations is captured in the following way.3 It is assumed that at period 1 the 
allocation W1 depends on the initial allocation W0 and the effort levels x1 and 
y1, according to the functional relation: 
2 In a previous article, I explored the effect of durability doctrines in one area–the erosion of 
entitlements in the presence of ongoing infringements (Ben-Shahar, 1999). Here, I develop a 
model that will generalize some of the insights discussed in previous work and to examine the 
implications of the model in a far broader setting than previously explored. 
3 The rent-seeking model below differs substantially from the standard rent-seeking model 
utilized in much of the economic literature. The standard model depicts a symmetric contest in 
which expenditures affect the probability of winning in a continuous manner. While that model 
would allow for an analysis of durability and relate it to a more general rent-seeking framework, 
it will be less applicable to the legal scenarios studied here. 
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W W if   x a
W by if   x a
1
0 1 1
0 1 1 1
= 
 <


That is, party A can, by spending sufficiently (no less than some threshold a1), 
guarantee a favorable outcome and prevent party B from extracting any value 
relative to the initial allocation. This is a common feature in many legal 
contests studied in this paper, like trials, in which there is an underlying 
“meritorious” party which the law seeks to identify, and where this party’s 
opportunity to affect the outcome cannot be matched by the other party. But 
when party A does not spend enough (less than a1), party B can extract some 
of the initial entitlement W0, depending on the level of effort that B sets (with 
the parameter b>1 measuring the “productivity” of B’s rent-seeking effort.4)
Different assumptions regarding the determinants of the threshold a1 will be 
analyzed below.5
Following the period-1 allocation, a second round of the allocation contest 
occurs at period 2. In this round, however, the resulting allocation depends not 
only on the rent-seeking effort by the parties, but also on the outcome of the 
period-1 contest. The particular weight attributed to the period-1 outcome in 
determining the period-2 allocation depends on the rule of durability, as will be 
explained below. 
The utility of each party equals the fraction of the entitlement that they 
secure, less the rent-seeking effort expended, summed over the two periods. 
Assuming no discounting,6 party A’s utility, denoted by UA, is: 
 UA = (W1 + W2) – (x1 + x2), 
and party B’s utility, UB, is: 
 UB = (W0 – W1) + (W0 – W2) – (y1 + y2). 
4 It is assumed here that party B’s effort yields linear returns. This assumption is not critical and 
can be substituted with a more general specification under which the value that B extracts is 
V(y), with V' > 0 and VJJ < 0.  
5 This model is consistent with several timing specifications, including a sequential-move 
setting in which either party moves first, or a simultaneous-moves setting. In analyzing the 
equilibrium behavior, it will be assumed that party B moves first and party A reacts after 
observing party B’s move. 
6 For simplicity, no discounting is assumed. As will be explicitly shown, none of the results 
below will depend on this restriction. 
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That is, party B enjoys the value he extracts each period less the cost of rent-
seeking. Note that an implicit assumption here is that the parties’ preferences 
do not change over time. This is an important assumption in the model; 
without it, parties may not have a private preference for durability.7
The analysis will examine three types of durability rules applicable to the 
period-2 allocation: 
(i) Periodic Allocation Regime (“PER”). Under this regime, the allocation decision 
is made anew at each period. Specifically, at the beginning of period 2, the 
period-1 allocation expires and a new allocation is made independently of the 
previous period-1 allocation, with the same baseline W0 that applied prior to 
the period-1 allocation back in place. Thus, the W2(.) function takes the form: 
W W if  x a
W by if  x a
2
0 2 2
0 2 2 2
= 
 <


(ii) Durable Allocation Regime (“DUR”). Under the Durable Allocation regime, 
the decision that is made at period 1 cannot be modified at period 2, no matter 
how much effort the parties exert. That is, the W2(.) function takes the 
redundant form: 
 W2 = W1, œ(x2, y2). 
 (iii) Revisable Allocation Regime (“REV”). Under this regime, the allocation 
decision of period 1 may be revised at period 2. If the parties exert no effort to 
affect the period-2 allocation, then it will remain W1. Thus, unlike the Periodic 
Allocation regime, the period-1 allocation does not expire, but rather it 
becomes the baseline for the period-2 allocation. Specifically, the period-2 
allocation can be written as a function of the previous allocation W1 and the 
change that is due to parties’ period-2 efforts: 
W W if   x a
W by if   x a
2
1 2 2
1 2 2 2
= 
 <


Thus, the period-1 allocation decision is most durable under the Durable 
Allocation regime and least durable under the Periodic Allocation regime. The 
7 This assumption can be discarded if W0 were interpreted not as a fixed value, but as a power 
to choose the desired allocation. Then, even if party A’s preferences changed from period 1 to 2, 
durability is favorable to him as it secures his ability to choose an adjusted outcome. 
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Revisable Allocation regime is, with respect to the durability property, an 
intermediate case: the period-1 outcome can be modified, but it does affect the 
baseline (and, indirectly, the outcome) at period 2. 
To illustrate, consider budgetary allocations made by the government. 
Discretionary spending programs that receive annual appropriations constitute 
a Periodic Allocation regime. Spending programs in which the government 
commits at the outset to long-term funding and which cannot be repealed 
would constitute a Durable Allocation regime. Other entitlement and tax 
expenditure programs for which funding is renewed automatically, as long as 
they remain unchanged, exemplify a Revisable Allocation regime. 
2.2.ANALYSIS
The analysis in this section studies equilibrium allocation decisions under the 
three rules of durability. 
2.2.1. Periodic Allocation Regime
Under the Periodic Allocation regime, in each period party A will spend either 
xt = at or xt = 0, depending on the value of rent-seeking “expropriation” 
attempted by B in that period. If the value of the expropriation that B is aiming 
for, byt, exceeds at, party A will prefer to spend at and prevent this 
expropriation. Otherwise, A would rather bear the expropriation than the cost 
of contesting it. Anticipating this level of tolerance by A, party B will exploit it 
to the limits and will tune his level of expenditure so as to chisel as much value 
as possible without invoking a contesting response from A. Therefore, as long 
as b>1,8 party B will choose a level of expenditure yt that satisfies byt = at. A
higher level will trigger a contesting response from A, and B will end up 
without any expropriation, while bearing the cost of the futile effort; a lower 
level will still be acquiesced to by A, but would yield B a lower payoff. Under 
this level of expropriation, party A cannot gain by spending the cost to fight it 
off (a cost of at), and will thus acquiesce.9 Hence, under this regime, at each 
period party B will set its rent-seeking effort at the level of yt = at/b and extract 
a value of a t from A’s initial allocation of W0, for a resulting allocation of W1 =
W2 = W0  at. Thus, party A’s total utility is 
8 If b 	 1, party B nets byt – yt 	 0, and will prefer to avoid rent-seeking actions.  
9 It is assumed that whenever indifferent between acquiescing to the expropriation (and losing 
a value equal to at) or fighting it off at a cost of at, A would acquiesce. Technically, it may be 
assumed that B’s effort is set just below the level described above, so as to break A’s 
indifference. All the results will hold under this interpretation as well. 
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UAPER = 2W0  (a1 + a 2), 
and party B’s total utility is 
UBPER =
b 1
b
 (a1 + a 2). 
In equilibrium, A does not expend any effort, but B’s expropriation fully 
reflects the sum of A’s periodic costs of securing its entitlement. 
2.2.2. Durable Allocation Regime
Under the Durable Allocation regime, W2 = W1. At period 1, party A will be 
less tolerant to rent-seeking by party B. Party A expects that any level of rent-
seeking which she does not contest at the present period will not only disfavor 
her in the period-1 allocation decision, but would also carry over to the period-
2 allocation. Thus, for any level of party B’s rent-seeking at period 1, by1, if A 
spends a1 at period 1 she expects to net over the two periods 2W0 - a1. If, 
instead, A does not spend a1 at period 1 and allows the expropriation to occur 
uncontested (spends 0), she expects to net 2(W0 - by1). To assure that A does 
not contest the expropriation, B should cautiously set his period-1 rent-seeking 
effort, y1, such that A will be indifferent between (or slightly less well-off by) 
spending versus not spending a1. This implies: 
2W0  a1 = 2(W0 - by1), 
which yields by1 = (½)a1. Thus, the period-1 allocation decision becomes W1 =
W0  (½)a1. Intuitively, under the Durable Allocation regime, party B sets a 
period-1 level of rent-seeking that is lower than under the Periodic allocation 
regime because he expects that party A will exhibit less tolerance. Party A has 
more to lose by not contesting any period-1 level of rent-seeking, and thus has 
a more credible threat to contest B. Anticipating A’s behavior, B–who still 
wishes to stretch A’s tolerance to the limit and yet avoid a contest–will set a 
lower level of expropriation. In the two-period model, B’s optimal strategy is to 
cut his level of expropriation by half, compared to the Periodic Allocation 
regime.10 Thus, W2 = W1 = W0 - (½)a1. Party A’s total utility across the two 
periods under this regime is  
10 Generally, in an n-period model without discounting, B would cut its first period 
expropriation by a factor of n, its second period expropriation by a factor of n-1, etc. 
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UADUR = 2(W0  (½)a1) = 2W0  a1.
Party B’s utility is  
UBDUR =
2b 1
2b
 a1 .
Once again, in equilibrium A does not expend any effort to contest B’s 
measured level of rent-seeking.  
2.2.3. Revisable Allocation Regime
Under the Revisable Allocation regime, begin by examining the period-2 
contest. At this stage, any level of rent-seeking effort by either party will be set 
against the new allocation, W1, that resulted from the period-1 interaction. 
Party B will choose a level of rent-seeking effort that would make party A 
indifferent between contesting and not contesting it. If A contests the 
additional expropriation, she can at best secure a value of W1 (at a cost of a2). If 
A does not contest the additional expropriation, she will retain a value of W1 
by2. Thus, party B will set y2 such that:  
W1  a2 = W1  by2,
or, y2 = a2/b. Thus, for any period-1 outcome W1, the period-2 allocation will 
be W2 = W1  a2.
Moving back to period 1, at this stage party A will be less tolerant to rent-
seeking by party B. Party A expects that any level of rent-seeking to which she 
acquiesces at the present period will set the baseline for the period-2 contest 
and, while revisable, will cost her twice. Thus, for any level of party B’s rent-
seeking at period 1, by1, if A spends a1 at period 1 she guarantees that W1 = W0
and her overall payoff would be W0  a1 + (W0  a2).  If, instead, A does not 
spend a1 at period 1 and allows the expropriation to occur uncontested (spends 
0), the period-1 outcome will be W1 = W0  by1 and her overall payoff would 
be (W0  by1) + (W0  by1  a2). To assure that A does not contest the 
expropriation, B should set his period-1 rent-seeking effort, y1, such that A will 
be indifferent between (or slightly less well-off by) spending versus not 
spending a1. This implies: 
(W0 - a1) + (W0 - a2) = (W0 - by1) + (W0 - by1 - a2), 
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which yields by1 = (½)a1. Thus, the period-1 allocation decision is W1 = W0 
(½)a1, and the period-2 allocation decision is W2 = W1  a2 = W0  (½)a1 a2.
Party A’s total utility across the two periods under this regime is  
UAREV = (W0  (½)a1) + (W1  a2) = 2W0  (a1 + a2). 
Party B’s total utility equals 
UBREV =
2b 1
2b
 a1 + b 1
b
 a2
2.2.4. Comparison of Regimes
The following table summarizes the comparison between the three durability 
rules: 
Regime Period-1 
Allocation
Period-2 
Allocation
Party A’s 
Utility
Party B’s 
Utility
Periodic W0  a1 W0  a2 2W0  (a1 + a2) b 1b

 (a1 + a2)
Durable W0  (½)a1 W0  (½)a1 2W0  a1 2b 12b

 a1
Revisabl
e
W0  (½)a1 W0  (½)a1  a2 2W0  (a1 + a2)
2b 1
2b

a1  +  
b 1
b

 a2
Table 1
Several general results emerge from this comparison: 
PROPOSITION 1.
(a) The entitlement holder’s (party A) utility is identical across the 
Periodic and Revisable Allocation regimes; it is highest under the 
Durable Allocation regime. 
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(b) The contesting party’s (party B) utility is highest under the Revisable 
Allocation regime; it is lowest under either the Durable or the Periodic 
Allocation regimes. 
(c) The deadweight loss due to rent-seeking activity is highest under the 
Periodic Allocation regime; it is lowest under the Durable Allocation 
regime. 
Discussion. (i) Neutrality between Periodic and Revisable Allocation regimes. For party A, 
the Revisable and Periodic Allocation regimes yield identical overall value, 2W0
 2a1, whereas the Durable Allocation regime provides a higher payoff, 2W0 
a1. In comparing the allocation under the Revisable and the Periodic Allocation 
regimes, note that while the profile of allocations over time varies across 
regimes--(W0  a1, W0  a2) under the Periodic Allocation regime and (W0
( 12 )a1, W0  ( 12 )a1  a2) under the Revisable Allocation regime--the overall 
utility of party A is the same. Under the Revisable Allocation regime, party A 
gets more at period 1 and less at period 2, but these differences wash out.  
 (ii) Intuition. Under all three regimes, party A, who has an initial 
entitlement of W0, is vulnerable to rent-seeking precisely in the magnitude of 
her cost of defense. Party B will chisel only so much value as to make party A 
unwilling to spend the cost of contesting the expropriation. Under the Periodic 
and Revisable regimes, there are two periods in which rent-seeking can occur, 
thus it costs party A the sum of a1 + a2 to defend and that value ends up 
equaling the exact amount of expropriation she suffers. Under the Durable 
regime there is only one period in which rent-seeking can occur, thus it costs 
party A only a1 to defend, which again sets the limit on the amount that can be 
expropriated from her. Stated differently, the reason that the Durable 
Allocation regime yields higher utility for party A is analogous to the reason 
why some consumers prefer durable over non-durable batteries: the durable 
batteries—even if more expensive—save the consumers the transaction cost of 
having to change batteries frequently.11 In general, the regimes might give rise 
to different values for party A only to the extent that they differ with respect to 
the defense costs that she is required to expend in order to continuously 
protect the initial allocation. If, say, under the Durable Allocation regime it 
were more costly to secure the initial allocation at period 1, then the advantage 
11 Alternatively, the Durable regime is preferable for the same reason that durable batteries 
which have a longer life but do not cost more would be preferable.  
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of this regime from A’s point of view diminishes, and–if that one-time cost 
exceeded (a1 + a2)–might become a disadvantage. This possibility will be 
examined below. 
 (iii) Why the Revisable regime is favorable to the contesting party. Party B’s 
payoff is highest under the Revisable Allocation regime. It is greater than under 
the Periodic Allocation regime because, while the value expropriated from A is 
the same under both regimes (a1 + a2), the period-1 cost that B needs to invest 
in order to secure this expropriation is smaller. Under the Revisable Allocation 
regime, B invests at period 1 half the cost that she invests under the Periodic 
Allocation regime, yet, by enjoying its effect for two periods, gets the same 
return. 12 Party B’s payoff under the Revisable Allocation regime is also higher 
in comparison with the Durable Allocation regime because, while the two 
regimes are identical with respect to the period-1 conduct, the Revisable 
Allocation regime provides party B with an additional opportunity to rent-seek 
profitably at period 2, an opportunity that does not exist under the Durable 
Allocation regime.13 Lastly, the comparison between the Durable and Periodic 
Allocation regimes is ambiguous. The Periodic Allocation regime provides B 
with more frequent opportunities to rent-seek profitably, but the Durable 
Allocation regime provides a greater return for the period-1 rent-seeking 
effort.14 
(iv) Deadweight Loss. To the extent that the rent-seeking actions taken 
by the parties have only an allocative effect (and no ex ante productive effect), 
it is worth examining how the regimes rank with respect to the overall cost 
invested in rent-seeking. Because party A does not invest any defense costs, we 
can focus on party B’s investment. The smallest investment in rent-seeking 
occurs under the Durable Allocation regime. Under this regime, there is only 
one instance of rent-seeking contest, whereas under the two other regimes, 
there are repeated instances. Also, due to the enhanced credibility of party A’s 
12 UB
REV - UB
PER = a1/(2b), which exactly equals the saving in cost of effort at period 1. 
13 UB
REV  UBDUR = b 1b
 a2, which exactly equals the net incremental gain to party B from the 
period-2 expropriation. 
14 UB
PER  UBDUR = ( 12b) a1 +
b 1
b
 a2, which could be either positive or negative. If b is 
sufficiently large, UB
PER > UB
DUR. In this case, the optimal levels of y1 and y2 will be relatively 
low, and thus the saving of rent-seeking costs involved with having to invest these effort only 
once under the Durable Allocation regime dwarfs in comparison with the gain involved in 
having a double opportunity to chisel under the Periodic Allocation regime. 
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threat to defend, the amount invested by party B in period 1 is smaller. The 
largest investment in rent-seeking occurs under the Periodic Allocation regime. 
Under this regime, there is a repeated instance of the rent-seeking contest, and, 
unlike both the Durable and Revisable regimes, there is no inhibiting effect in 
period 1. 
 (v) Discounting. The analysis above assumed zero-discounting. Adding 
positive discounting into the analysis will not change the qualitative results. In 
particular, the equivalence, from the entitlement holder’s point of view, 
between the Periodic and the Revisable regime remains (even though under the 
Revisable regime the period-1 payoff is higher and the period-2 payoff is 
lower). With discounting, the durability accorded to the period-1 outcome 
under the Revisable regime is less valuable to the entitlement holder. Thus, her 
incentives to prevent chiseling will diminish. Discounting reduces the 
entitlement holder’s incentive to secure a high period-1 allocation; and, at the 
same time, it reduces the cost to the entitlement holder of the period-2 
expropriation. These two effects balance out. Overall, under either the 
Revisable regime or the Periodic regime, for every discount factor *, the value 
that party B can expropriate is (a1 + *a2)—the discounted value of the 
entitlement holder’s defense costs.15 
2.3.ENDOGENOUS DEFENSE COSTS
The analysis above was based on the assumption that party A can secure an 
undiminished entitlement by spending an exogenous sum a (which could 
potentially vary across periods). One of the main results obtained was that 
party A is better off under the Durable regime, having to defend only once at a 
cost of a1, rather than twice over two periods at a cost of a1 + a2 under the less 
durable regimes. It is possible, however, that the magnitude of the defense cost 
would vary across regimes. In particular, under the Durable Allocation regime 
the period-1 cost for the entitlement holder to defend her entitlement might be 
higher than under, say, the Periodic regime. Intuitively, under a Durable regime 
the period-1 contest involves higher stakes, leading party B to contest the 
entitlement more vigorously, thereby making it more difficult for the 
entitlement holder to “win.” This section tries to provide an underpinning for 
this intuition. 
15 Under the durable regime, the value that party B can expropriate remains a1, independent of 
the discounting factor *. The general principle, that the overall expropriation equals the overall 
defense costs applies, and since the defense costs under the Durable regime are (the non-
discounted, period-1) a1, this is the value of the expropriation. 
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2.3.1. Defense Cost Depends on the Opponent’s Attempted Expropriation
One way to model an endogenous defense cost is to assume that the more 
party B invests in rent-seeking (higher y), the costlier it becomes for party A to 
defend her entitlement. For example, if party A is interested in a government 
appropriation and party B is an opposing interest group, it is likely that the 
more party B spends on lobbying against A’s favorable allocation, the more 
costly it will be for party A to secure the appropriation. Formally, it will be 
assumed that party B’s investment y has a dual effect. First, as before, it 
expropriates value from party A. Second, it increases party A’s defense cost, 
which could now be denoted as a function of y, namely: a = a(y), with a
(y) > 0 
and a

 (y) < 0.16 For simplicity (and without loss of generality), it will be 
assumed that the effect of y on party A’s defense cost is the same across the 
two periods: a1(y) = a2(y)  a(y).17 
Under the Periodic Allocation regime, at each period party B will set 
the level of rent-seeking expenditure according to the following condition: 
by = a(y). 
When this equality is satisfied, party B is assured that party A is indifferent 
between acquiescing to the expropriation (a loss of by) and contesting it (a cost 
of a(y)). Denote the equilibrium level of rent-seeking under the Periodic regime 
as yPER. The overall allocation resulting from these levels of rent-seeking is thus 
2W0  2a(yPER). 
Under the Durable Allocation regime, at period 1 party B will set the 
level of rent-seeking expenditure according to the following condition: 
2by = a(y). 
When this equality is satisfied, party B is assured that party A is indifferent 
between acquiescing to the expropriation (a loss of by, doubled over the two 
periods) and contesting it (a one-time cost of a(y)). Denote equilibrium level of 
16 The assumption of a negative second derivative is plausible in this context, although lacking 
generality. On the characteristics of rent-seeking contests with diminishing, increasing, or 
constant returns to scale, see Tullock (1980). 
17 Here, again, the model varies from the standard rent-seeking model, which assumes 
continuity of the outcome with respect to symmetric rent-seeking efforts. Under the standard 
model, the more one party invests, the more favorable to him the outcome. With increased 
durability, the stakes rise and parties invest more. Depending on the relative productivities of 
investment, the outcome of the contest may or may not depend on its durability. 
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rent-seeking under the Durable regime as yDUR. The overall allocation resulting 
from this level of rent-seeking is 2W0  a(yDUR). 
Under the Revisable Allocation regime, at period 1 party B will set the 
level of rent-seeking expenditure according to a similar condition as under the 
Durable regime (yDUR), and at period 2 party B will set the level of rent-seeking 
expenditure according to a similar condition as under the Periodic regime 
(yPER). Thus, the overall allocation resulting from these levels of rent-seeking is 
2W0  a(yDUR)  a(yPER). To compare the three regimes, the following 
proposition can be stated: 
PROPOSITION 2
When defense costs depend on the opponent’s expropriation effort, the 
entitlement holder’s (party A) utility is highest under the Durable 
Allocation regime and lowest under the Periodic Allocation regime. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Discussion. (i) Intuition. The reason that the Durable regime guarantees the 
highest payoff to party A is twofold. First, as in Section 2.2 above, party A 
benefits from the fact that only one instance of rent-seeking, rather than two, 
can occur. Second, party A’s enhanced incentive under the Durable regime to 
defend her entitlement reduces party B’s optimal level of rent-seeking, which in 
turn reduces party A’s cost of defense. This result suggests that, at least within 
the assumptions of the model, the conjecture that the entitlement holder’s 
defense cost would rise under the Durable regime is not valid. To the contrary, 
the Durable regime becomes even more favorable to the entitlement holder. 
The reason: while it is true that if party B were to spend more at period 1 then 
party A would have been worse off, party B in fact spends less. Party B spends 
less on rent-seeking at period 1 because he recognizes that party A has, under 
the Durable regime, a greater incentive to defend the entitlement. Knowing 
that he faces a more determined opponent, party B spends less on period-1 
rent-seeking, which, in turn, endogenously reduces party A’s period-1 defense 
cost. Put differently, the above conjecture fails because it does not recognize 
that, just as party B would try to increase the defense cost to party A, party A 
would try to do the opposite. Party A’s added incentive to defend under the 
Durable regime reduces not only the rent-expropriation, but also the cost of 
defense. 
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2.3.2. Defense Cost Depends on Pre-Contest Expenditures
Another way to capture the added incentive of party B to expropriate value 
under the Durable regime is to enable party B to directly affect party A’s 
defense costs (rather than indirectly, as a byproduct of the rent-seeking effort.) 
Specifically, suppose that each period of the rent-seeking contest is divided into 
two rounds. In the first round, party B makes an investment that has no direct 
effect on the entitlement, but merely affects the defense costs of party A. In 
the second round, once the defense costs have been established, party A and B 
engage in a rent-seeking contest as described in the previous section, where 
party B can spend an additional effort to expropriate value. Formally, it can be 
assumed that at the outset of each period t in which a rent-seeking contest is 
about to occur, party B chooses some investment expenditure zt  0, having 
the sole effect of determining the value of at, such that at = at(zt) (with the 
standard assumptions that at' > 0 and at'' < 0). This pre-contest expenditure 
can be the filing of discovery motions in a trial contest (increasing the litigation 
cost to the other party), hiring high-powered lobbyists in a legislative contest 
(forcing the opposing group to increase its own expenditure), and the like. 
Following this preliminary expenditure, both parties can expend x and y to 
affect the resulting allocation Wt.
PROPOSITION 3
When an opponent can directly spend to increase the entitlement 
holder’s defense costs, the entitlement holder’s utility may no longer be 
highest under the Durable Allocation regime. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Discussion. Under the Durable Allocation regime, party B would spend more to 
make party A’s defense costly. Party A would thus face a higher defense cost at 
period 1 and would be subjected to a greater rent-expropriation in that period, 
relative to the Periodic regime. Notice, however, that the reason that party B 
spends more under the Durable regime is not the “increased stakes.” Under 
both the Durable and the Periodic regimes, party B will succeed in extracting 
the full a1, and there is no inherent reason why party B would be more driven 
to push the value of a1 up under the Durable regime. Nevertheless, the reason 
that party B spends more to push the value of a1 up under the Durable regime 
is that, once a1 is set, under the Durable regime party B can extract a1 at a lower 
cost (having to spend only half the rent-seeking cost at period 1, and enjoying 
it “freely” at period 2; see Proposition 1(b).) Thus, under the Durable regime, 
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an investment in raising a1 yields a higher subsequent return, and therefore the 
level of investment—and the corresponding value of a1— would be higher.  
2.4.NON-DEFENSIBLE ENTITLEMENTS
A critical and quite restrictive assumption underlying the framework studied 
above is that the entitlement holder can, by spending an affordable sum of a, 
preserve her entitlement unscathed. Because party B considered credible party 
A’s threat to contest any rent-seeking action that costs A more than a, party B 
tuned his level of rent-seeking accordingly, and the parameter “a” in fact 
determined the extent of party B’s equilibrium level of rent-seeking. It might 
often be the case, however, that an entitlement holder cannot perfectly defend 
her entitlement from expropriation, or can do so only if she spends an 
exceedingly high sum. Relative to the stakes involved and to party B’s optimal 
rent-seeking action, a might be prohibitively high. In this case, either party A 
does not contest B’s rent-seeking action and allows B to extract value, or party 
A does spend costs to defend her entitlement, but these costs can only reduce, 
not eliminate, the expropriation. 
To model this situation, let us assume that party B’s cumulative rent-seeking 
effort, y1 + y2, cannot exceed some exogenous level y, and that 2by < a. There 
are two reasons why party B’s expenditures might be capped in this way. First, 
liquidity and budget constraints or regulatory limitations might prohibit party B 
from spending more than y, which—in the absence of such constraints—he 
would. Second, in choosing his level of effort, party B might face an 
optimization problem which would lead him to choose not to spend more than y.
For example, if the marginal returns to rent-seeking effort are diminishing, B 
would not want to spend beyond the point at which the marginal return is less 
than the marginal cost of effort.18 That is, no matter how party B divides his 
rent-seeking expenditure across periods, it would never be in party A’s interest 
to challenge B and to spend defense costs.19 We will also explore the possibility 
that a is prohibitively high only in some, but not all, periods. 
18 To provide an underpinning for the assumption that party B is constrained by an exogenous 
level of spending, consider the specification in note 4, in which the return to rent-seeking is 
captured by the concave function V(y). Party B chooses y to maximize V(y) – y subject to the 
constraint that V(y) is not too high as to induce party A to defend. Under the Periodic regime, 
this constraint is V(y) # a, and under the Durable or Revisable regimes the constraint is V(y) #
(½)a. If a is high enough, the same interior solution arises under all regimes, in which case the 
“cap” on party B’s spending is independent of the durability rule and can be analyzed as 
exogenous. 
19 This characterization is restrictive in two ways. First, by constraining B’s expenditures 
exogenously, it does not take into account the way that the different durability rules might affect 
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Periodic Allocation Regime. Under this regime, party B could potentially divide 
his expenditure between the two periods. For any division (y1, y2) he chooses, 
the resulting allocations will be: 
 W1 = W0 – by1
W2 = W0 – by2
Thus, irrespective of the division of expenditures across periods, party A’s total 
utility from the two-period allocation is UAPER = 2W0 – by, and party B’s utility 
is UBPER = (b – 1)y. 
Durable Allocation Regime. Under this regime, W2 = W1 and is not affected by 
an investment of y2. Thus, party B will never find it desirable to spend any level 
of effort at period 2. At period 1, he expects to have no future opportunity to 
affect the outcome, and thus expends the entire effort y on influencing the 
present, period-1 outcome. This yields: 
 W1 = W2 = W0 – by. 
Party A’s total utility from the two-period allocation is UADUR = 2W0 – 2by, and 
party B’s utility is UBDUR = (2b – 1)y.  
Revisable Allocation regime. Under this regime, party B may again divide his 
expenditure between the two periods. For any division (y1, y2), the resulting 
allocations will be: 
W1 = W0 – by1
W2 = W1 – by2 = W0 – by. 
Notice that because rent-seeking effort is cumulative under this regime 
(namely, the period-2 allocation depends both on period-1 and period-2 effort) 
the period-2 allocation outcome is independent of the inter-temporal division. 
For any division of effort (y1, y2), party B’s utility is 
the total level of B’s spending. This restriction will be relaxed below. Second, it is assumed that 
in addition to being unable to fend off the expropriation in its entirety, party A is also unable to 
reduce its level by investing less than a. It turns out that this restriction does not diminish the 
generality of the results. Qualitatively similar results would arise if both A and B were able to 
spend up to exogenously limited sums and if the allocation outcome were a continuous function 
of both parties’ expenditures. 
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UBREV = (2b – 1)y1 + (b – 1)y2.
Substituting y – y1 for y2 yields:  
UBREV = (b – 1)y + by1. 
Choosing y1 to maximize this expression yields y1 = y. That is, party B will 
strictly prefer to spend his entire rent-seeking effort upfront, at period 1. Every 
dollar that is shifted from period 2 to period 1 generates a net marginal 
increase in utility of b, because it will affect both the period-1 allocation 
(directly) and the period-2 allocation (indirectly). If, instead, this dollar 
spending were postponed until period 2, it would have affected only the 
period-2 allocation. It is therefore never optimal to conserve some of the rent-
seeking effort for period 2. Hence, party A’s utility under the Revisable 
Allocation regime equals UAREV = 2W0 – 2by and party B’s utility equals UBREV 
= (2b-1)y. 
The following table summarizes the comparison between the three durability 
rules: 
Regime Period-1 
Allocation
Period-2 
Allocation
Party A’s 
utility
Party B’s 
utility
Periodic W0  by 1 W0  by 2 2W0  by (b-1)y
Durable W0  by W0  by 2W0  2by (2b-1)y
Revisable W0  by W0  by 2W0  2by (2b-1)y
Table 2
The following results emerge from this comparison: 
PROPOSITION 4
When the entitlement holder (party A) cannot defend against rent-
seeking, but the rent-seeker (party B) cannot spend more than an 
exogenous sum, the entitlement holder’s utility is highest under the 
Periodic Allocation regime, and it is identical under the Durable and the 
Revisable Allocation regimes. Conversely, the rent-seeker’s utility is 
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lowest under the Periodic Allocation regime, and it is identical under the 
Durable and the Revisable Allocation regimes. 
Remarks. (i) Durable versus Revisable Allocations. Under both the Durable and the 
Revisable Allocation regimes, the entire rent-seeking effort is spent at period 1. 
Under the Durable Allocation regime, this is so because there is no legal 
opportunity for rent-seeking at period 2. Under the Revisable Allocation 
regime, the opportunity exists, but the entire effort is spent upfront because it 
is never optimal to delay any expenditure until period 2, given that the same 
effect on the period-2 allocation can be achieved through a period-1 
investment, which then also affects the period-1 outcome. Thus, the choice 
between the Durable and Revisable Allocation regimes is irrelevant. The same 
pattern of rent-seeking and the same distributive outcome emerges under both 
regimes. In equilibrium, the period-1 allocation under the Revisable Allocation 
regime is not modified at period 2, and it is effectively as durable as under the 
Durable Allocation regime. 
 (ii) Periodic Allocation Regime. Under the Periodic regime the effort is 
split between the two periods. Due to the assumption that the marginal return 
to effort is constant and fixed across periods, any division of effort yields the 
same outcome under the Periodic Allocation regime. The reason that party A is 
better off under the Periodic regime is that the Durable and the Revisable 
regimes magnify the effect of rent-seeking. Any period-1 expropriation by 
party B under these two regimes lingers for two periods, whereas under the 
Periodic regime it has only a short-run, one-period effect. Stated differently, 
the reason why party A is better off under the Periodic Allocation regime is 
analogous to the reason why a consumer would prefer to lease a new car for 
short periods rather than for long periods. If, say, the cost of two (periodic) 
one-year leases is roughly the same as the cost of one (durable or renewable) 
two-year lease, the consumer gets a chance to replace the vehicle twice as 
often, thereby reducing by half the average age of the vehicle she is driving and 
reducing the inconvenience of wear and tear.  
2.5.RETURNS TO EFFORT VARY ACROSS PERIODS
How would the rent-seeking actions of the parties and their payoffs be affected 
by the fact that returns to rent-seeking effort vary across periods? The analysis 
in Section B above accounted for the possibility that party A’s defense costs 
might vary across periods (a1  a2), yet it did not capture the substitution effect 
that might occur in allocating rent-seeking effort across periods. There, we saw 
that party B will fully exploit A’s costs of defense at each period. To capture 
the incentive of parties to shift effort to periods in which returns to effort are 
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high, consider again a setting in which a1  a2, but assume now in addition that 
in one of these periods the defense costs are prohibitively high. That is, party A 
is assumed to be able to effectively defend her entitlement only during one of 
the two periods. In the other period, she is defenseless. This, we can expect, 
would lead party B to shift a greater portion of his rent-seeking effort to the 
period in which A is defenseless. However, this substitution effect might be 
constrained by the durability rules, as the analysis below explores. 
Assume, as before, that party B’s cumulative rent-seeking effort, y1 + y2,
cannot exceed the exogenous level y. Assume, in addition, that a1 < a2.
Specifically, consider a case in which a1 < 2by < a2. That is, party A might be 
able to challenge B’s rent-seeking at period 1, but would never find it feasible 
to challenge party B’s rent-seeking at period 2.20 
Periodic Allocation Regime. Under this regime, party B would divert the bulk of 
his expenditure to period 2, exploiting A’s defenselessness. At period 1, party B 
will measure his action so as not to trigger a defense response from party A, 
and will thus set y1 	 a1. At period 2, party B will spend its entire remaining 
effort, y2 = y  y1. (One possible outcome under this regime is for party B to 
set y1 = 0 and y2 = y.) The resulting allocations will be: 
W1 = W0 – by1
W2 = W0 – b(y  y1)
Thus, irrespective of the exact division of rent-seeking across periods, party A’s 
total utility is UAPER = 2W0 – by, and party B’s utility is UBPER = (b – 1)y. 
Durable Allocation Regime. Under this regime, party B will not divert any effort 
towards the “high-return” period 2, because at that period the outcome can no 
longer be revisited. At period 1, then, party B will spend the maximal tolerable 
effort so as not to trigger a defense by party A. As has been shown above, 
recognizing that she has more to lose by acquiescing to rent-seeking at period 
1, party A will be more eager to defend her entitlement. Thus, although her 
cost of defense is a1, party B will not exploit it all and will only set a level of 
rent-seeking such that by1 = (½)a1. Thus, y1 = a1
2b
and y2 = 0. This yields: 
 W1 = W2 = W0 – (½)a1.
20 The opposite case, in which a1 > a2, is of less interest as it only replicates the result of the a1
= a2 case. The reason will be explained below. 
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Party A’s utility is UADUR = 2W0 – a1, and party B’s utility is UBDUR = (2b – 
1) a
2b
1 .
Revisable Allocation Regime. Under this regime, party B will on the one hand 
want to spend more effort at period 1 to enjoy its longer-term effect, but on 
the other hand will want to shift effort to period 2, in which party A is 
defenseless. In equilibrium, party B will spend only so much at period 1 so as 
not to trigger defensive action by A. As under the Durable regime, the period-1 
rent-seeking action will be further restrained by party A’s enhanced eagerness 
to defend, thus by1 = (½)a1. At period 2, party B will spend the remaining 
effort in its entirety, that is, y2 = y – y1 = y – a
2b
1 . The resulting allocations will 
be: 
W1 = W0 – (½)a1
W2 = W1 – b(y – a
2b
1 ) = W0 – by. 
Again, because rent-seeking effort is cumulative under this regime (namely, the 
period-2 allocation depends both on period-1 and period-2 effort), the period-
2 allocation outcome is independent of the inter-temporal division. Hence, 
party A’s utility under the Revisable Allocation regime equals UAREV = 2W0 –
by – (½)a1 and party B’s utility equals UBREV = (b-1)y + (½)a1.
The following table summarizes the comparison between the three durability 
rules: 
Regime Period-1 
Allocation
Period-2 
Allocation
Party A’s 
Utility
Party B’s 
Utility
Periodic W0  ba1 W0  b(y  a1) 2W0  by (b-1)y
Durable W0 – (½)a1 W0 – (½)a1 2W0  a1 (2b-1) a2b
1
Revisable W0 – (½)a1 W0  by 2W0  by – (½)a1 (b-1)y + (½)a1.
Table 3
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PROPOSITION 5
Suppose the entitlement holder (party A) can only defend against rent-
seeking at period 1 and the rent-seeker (party B) cannot spend overall 
more than an exogenous sum. Then the entitlement holder’s utility is 
lowest under the Revisable Allocation regime. It is highest under the 
Periodic Allocation regime if and only if a1 > by. Conversely, the rent-
seeker’s utility is highest under the Revisable Allocation regime. It is 
lowest under the Periodic Allocation regime if a1 > by. 
Remarks. (i) Why is the entitlement holder worse off under the Revisable Allocation regime?
The reason that under the Revisable Allocation regime the rent-seeker does 
better and the entitlement holder does worse, relative to the Periodic 
Allocation regime, is due solely to the fact that under the Revisable regime it 
takes a smaller effort at period 1 to achieve the same constrained expropriation 
value, thus freeing more rent-seeking effort towards the period 2 contest. (This 
is the same effect that underlay Proposition 4.) Relative to the Durable regime, 
the entitlement holder is worse off under the Revisable regime due to the 
opportunity that party B has under the Revisable regime to conduct additional, 
period-2 rent-seeking. (This is the same effect that underlay Proposition 1.) 
 (ii) Periodic v. Durable Allocation Regime. Neither the Periodic nor the 
Durable Allocation regime is unambiguously preferable to the entitlement 
holder. Under the Periodic regime, the entitlement holder suffers a combined 
expropriation of by, whereas under the Durable regime she suffers an 
expropriation valued at a1. It is only when a1 is sufficiently low (a1 < by) that the 
Durable regime will yield a higher payoff. 
3.APPLICATIONS
3.1.LEGAL TRANSITIONS: THE DURABILITY OF RULES
An important type of legal durability involves the durability of rules. Legislated 
rules may be more or less durable depending on several factors, including the 
stipulated date of their expiration as determined in the original enactment and 
the ease with which the legislator or the regulator can change the rules to adopt 
new policies. One critical factor affecting the durability of rules, which received 
considerable attention in the legal literature, is the requirement to compensate 
parties who stand to lose from the transition. If the law can be changed 
retroactively, or prospectively but without compensating the losers, it is less 
durable. If, instead, transition relief is required, the original law—and the 
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entitlements it allocates—are more durable. Transition relief increases 
durability because the entitlement’s duration is extended beyond the time of its 
formal repeal, as it continues to provide a right for monetary payoffs.  
There are different ways to explain the dynamics of legal transitions and how 
they come about. One prominent explanation focuses on the political economy 
of legislation, suggesting that rent-seeking by interest groups is the force that 
affects legal transitions. According to this account, interested parties expend 
political capital and other forms of influence to acquire favorable, or reject 
unfavorable, legal rules. Understanding the incentives of interest groups is thus 
crucial to explaining legal transitions. How are interest groups affected by the 
durability dimension of legal rules? Surely, if a given rule is favorable to an 
interest group, the beneficiaries would prefer the rule to be durable, 
guaranteeing that, even if the rule is changed, the benefits would continue to 
accrue in the form of transition relief. However, applying the framework of 
this paper suggests that the added durability does not necessarily benefit the 
favored group. When the legal transition norm requires relief to affected 
parties, and thereby accords greater durability to the favorable rule, the ex ante 
effect is to make this rule more difficult to acquire. The price, in terms of rent-seeking 
effort and political capital, that would be required to secure the rule is greater, 
both because rule-makers realize that they will not have additional 
opportunities to extract value in the incidence of reshaping the rule, and 
because the stakes for opposing interest groups become greater, inducing them 
to pose greater opposition to the rule’s initial enactment. What, then, is the 
overall effect of transition relief and greater durability on the value obtained by 
the benefiting group? 
The framework developed above is useful in identifying the two effects of 
increased durability. The availability of transition relief is equivalent to the 
model’s Durable Allocation regime, while norms allowing uncompensated 
transition are equivalent to either a Revisable Allocation regime or a Periodic 
Allocation regime (the latter only if the original enactment expires irrespective 
of post-enactment lobbying.) Generally, greater durability shifts rent-seeking 
effort to the pre-allocation stage (the period-1 allocation), and away from the 
post-allocation stage (period 2). An implication of Proposition 1 is that the 
main factor that accounts for the difference between the net value enjoyed by 
the entitlement holders under the Durable versus the other regimes is the 
entitlement holder’s cost of securing the favorable allocation. Specifically, it 
was shown that the overall value to the benefiting group equals the initial 
allocation (representing, say, a historical entitlement or a political bias of the 
legislature) less the cost of rent-seeking, and that the cost of rent-seeking is the 
same under the Revisable and the Periodic Allocation regimes. The advantage 
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of the Durable Allocation regime is the saving of lobbying costs at the post-
enactment stage, but the flip side is the potentially increased lobbying cost at 
the pre-enactment stage. Proposition 3 suggests that the Durable regime, by 
making the period-1 contest more ferocious, might not be favorable to the 
beneficiary group.  
In the context of legal transitions, several authors have already applied 
fragments of this framework to study the desirability of transition relief norms. 
The fact that transition relief affects the incentives of interested parties to 
lobby and “purchase” legal rules is well recognized. Ever since Louis Kaplow’s 
(1986) seminal work on legal transitions, many writers have noticed the 
“period-2 effect,” that is, that compensation of losers would reduce entitlement 
holders’ incentive to oppose changes.21 Some writers have also noticed the 
“period-1 effect,” that is, that compensation of losers would increase the 
interested parties’ incentives to expend pre-enactment effort towards securing a 
favorable enactment.22 More broadly, it has been recognized that increasing the 
durability of legislation makes it more costly to secure, in terms of lobbying 
cost and the “price” demanded by legislators.23 Writers have also speculated 
about the balance of these two effects. Most notably, Shaviro (2000) has 
suggested that the two effects generated by increased durability might offset 
each other (Ramseyer and Nakazato, 1989:1167).24 
While the proposed framework cannot resolve unambiguously the question 
regarding the balance of the two effects, it highlights some factors that affect 
this comparison. First, Proposition 1 suggests that adopting a durable policy 
(full transition relief) might not necessarily affect the division of rent-seeking 
effort across time, since parties benefit from concentrating every bit of effort 
upfront even under the alternative Revisable regime. It is only in situations in 
21 Levmore (1993:289) observes that in the presence of transition relief “[i]dentifiable losers 
will not need to waste resources lobbying for protection;” while Stark (1996:179) notes that in 
the absence of relief, investors would “[f]ight vigorously any congressional effort to repeal any of 
the tax benefits available to them.” 
22 E.g., Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989:1173) claim that benefiting parties “[b]id more 
aggressively for the tax-guaranteed projects at the outset”; Levmore (1999:1676) argues that “If 
nothing is final and the rules of aggressive change apply, then it is possible that interest groups 
and other investors will not devote resources to influencing decisionmakers because there is no 
point in acquiring something that can be undone at a later date.” 
23 Landes and Posner (1975:877-878) note that if legislation were to be altered unfavorably or 
repealed after a few months or years, the “price” Congressmen could demand would be lower. 
24 See Shaviro (2000), “An effective guarantee of transition relief would therefore yield an 
ambiguous tradeoff[:] more enactment period lobbying in exchange for less post-enactment 
lobbying.” See also Fishel and Sykes (1999:379), “different policies might produce changes in the 
timing of these expenditures, but the total amount in present value terms should remain 
constant.” 
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which the upfront enactment is periodic and known to expire within a given 
period that parties will distribute effort over time. Thus, the assertion that 
under a Revisable regime interest groups will be reluctant to lobby for rules at 
the outset is not confirmed by the model. Even when parties expect a future 
opportunity to revisit the policy (say, after an election), they would rationally 
choose to forgo the expenditure at that future period and concentrate 
resources to the initial enactment stage. This does not mean, though, that when 
transition is easy and the legal rule is expected to be short-lived (a Periodic or a 
Revisable regime) that parties will abstain from devoting rent-seeking 
resources.25 The analysis shows that interested parties will devote as much 
overall effort, yet distributed more uniformly over time. Furthermore, as the 
analysis of Section 2.5 demonstrates, the tendency to concentrate resources at 
the pre-enactment stage would weaken if the parties expected future rent-
seeking effort to be more productive (say, due to an anticipated favorable shift 
in political power). In such a case, under a full transition relief norm, the rent-
seeking effort would still be concentrated at the pre-enactment stage, but under 
a no-transition relief norm more rent-seeking effort would be shifted to the 
post-enactment stage in which it is more effective. In contrast to a common 
intuition, Proposition 2 demonstrates that it might even be the case that–due to 
diminishing marginal returns to effort–more rent-seeking effort will be 
expended the less durable the regime. 
Lastly, Proposition 1 implies that as long as it takes the same amount of 
political capital to either influence decision makers to enact a favorable 
entitlement or to influence them not to revoke the entitlement, a norm of full-
relief makes the benefiting party better off. Under such a norm, the rent-
seeking effort must be spent only once, whereas, in the absence of the norm, 
effort must be spent repeatedly.  
In sum, the framework proposed in this paper organizes a method to examine 
the distributive effects of legal transition norms. By focusing on the way in 
which durability affects the incentives to rent-seek, it is possible to identify the 
factors that make each interest group set its optimal strategy, and the likely 
effect of these refined strategies on the overall allocation. 
3.2.THE DURABILITY OF FISCAL POLICY
Related to the legal transition issue is the durability of fiscal allocations by the 
government. Interest groups often compete not only over favorable legal 
regimes, but also over direct budgetary allocations and government 
25 Levmore (1999:1676), argues that under a no-relief norm there is no point in influencing the 
policy.  
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appropriations, as well as procurement projects, monopoly franchises and 
other government conveyances and contracts. Consider budgetary spending: it 
is split into three types of programs: annual appropriations that expire unless 
renewed (Periodic Allocation), spending provisions that remain in effect unless 
repealed (Revisable Allocation), and, extraordinarily protected budgets that 
cannot be revised such as Social Security (Durable Allocation). Similarly, 
government contracts can be more or less durable, depending on whether the 
government can breach the contract without having to pay the full scope of 
remedies for breach available in non-government contract law. In some areas 
in which it operates, the government engages in governmental (as distinguished 
from proprietary) functions which it cannot contract away, and thus cannot 
enter binding enforceable contracts (a Revisable regime). In other areas, 
contracts or conveyances are binding and irrevocable (a Durable regime.) 
Would the beneficiaries of government allocations be interested in having 
these allocations be more durable? The commonsense intuition in the 
administrative law literature suggests that the answer is ‘yes.’ It is often argued 
that entitlement programs are more valuable to interest groups than annual 
appropriations because they are more durable.26 However, it is also commonly 
recognized that the process involved in reaching budgetary allocation decisions 
is a political contest between rent-seeking interest groups. This, in turn, 
suggests that the more durable types of budgetary allocations, while more 
desirable ex post, are also politically more difficult to obtain, ex ante.27 
The analysis in this paper suggests that the choice between revisable and 
periodic types of allocations makes less of a difference than commonly 
perceived. If the allocation is more durable, interest groups will concentrate 
effort upfront. Proposition 1 shows that the greater ex ante cost exactly 
balances with the greater ex post benefit, and thus the two regimes are 
distribution-equivalent. This insight was recently articulated in the context of 
government contracts. It has been correctly claimed that if the government 
cannot modify a fiscal arrangement such as a monopoly franchise, “it may 
simply force interest groups to roll the dice today one time for higher stakes 
rather than to roll the dice repeatedly over a period of years for proportionately 
smaller stakes on each roll. In that event, everything may ‘come out in the 
wash’ and the present value of rent-seeking expenditures in pursuit of a given 
26 Elizabeth Garrett (1998b:421) observes that “spending through tax code entitlement is often 
more valuable to interest groups appropriated benefits […] because they usually need not be 
renewed once they are established and the funding is automatic as long as the law remains 
unchanged.” But she also recognizes that the more durable the entitlements required, the more 
costly to secure (1998a). 
27 This effect is also well-recognized. See, e.g., Landes and Posner (1975); Macey (1992:674). 
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arrangement will be the same under either rule” (Fishel and Sykes, 1999:344). It 
is the cost-structure of rent-seeking, and not the durability of the entitlement 
per se, that matters for the distribution of fiscal spending. It has also been 
speculated that under a no-revocation rule, the amount of rent-seeking and the 
payoff to the interest group will increase, because it can pick the most effective 
time to apply influence over the government.29 This argument is confirmed by 
Proposition 4: when the interest group can more cheaply secure a beneficial 
allocation at period 1, it will be best off under the Durable Allocation regime. 
Similarly, Proposition 2 suggests that if the cost for an interest group to defend 
its appropriation increases with the magnitude of opposition by other groups, it 
will again enjoy the highest payoff under the Durable Allocation regime, but 
this time for a different reason: it now has more of an incentive to enter the 
costly battle. 
Another conjecture raised in the political rent-seeking literature suggests that 
increasing the durability of a legislative or regulatory deal would increase the 
overall spending of the interest groups in securing such deals, thus benefiting 
the legislator (Landes and Posner, 1975:879).30 This conjecture is not 
confirmed by the analysis here. Party B, who represents the interest group that 
is trying to expropriate value, would find it more difficult to achieve such 
expropriation if the period-1 allocation lasts more than one period. Namely, 
the shift from a Periodic regime to a Revisable regime—effectuated by making 
a legislative deal more difficult to repeal—does not increase the value that party 
B can extract, and thus would not increase the premium paid to the legislator. 
Put differently, as long as the amount that the legislature has to allocate is 
invariant across durability regimes, the shift along a continuum from a Periodic 
to a Revisable regime, or from a frequently revisable to a less-frequently 
revisable regime, does not change the overall allocation.31 
28 Daniel R. Fishel and Alan O. Sykes, Government Liability for Breach of Contract, 1 Amer. L. Econ. 
Rev. 313, 344 (1999). 
29 Fishel and Sykes (1999:343): “Imagine an interest group knows that it has the votes today in 
the legislature to secure a monopoly franchise […]. The ability to obtain a benefit with certainty 
today and in perpetuity is worth more than the opportunity to obtain the same benefit today 
along with a chance to retain in perpetuity. And because the benefit is more valuable, interest 
groups should rationally spend more (in present value) to secure it.” 
30 But Macey (1998:178) notes that “More durable statutes and regulations will be worth more 
to politicians than less durable statutes and regulations because interest groups are willing to pay 
for durability.” 
31 Elhauge (1991) recognizes that the benefit of added durability to a beneficiary interest group 
could balance out with the cost of securing the allocation in the first place. 
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3.3.RES JUDICATA AND RELATED DOCTRINES: THE DURABILITY OF 
TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
Another type of legal durability involves the durability of trial court outcomes.
Decisions by a trial court may be more or less durable depending on the 
opportunities for the parties to have another panel reconsider the issues and 
potentially change the outcome. If one or both parties are barred from seeking 
a review of the decision, the original decision is more durable. Several 
prominent doctrines of legal procedure determine the durability of court 
decisions. The doctrine of double jeopardy, for example, prevents the prosecution 
from trying, through appeal or retrial, to overturn an initial trial acquittal. This 
doctrine makes one type of outcome—acquittal—more durable. Similarly, the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel determines when a judgment can be used to bar re-
litigation of the same issues in a subsequent case. This doctrine makes the 
original judgment more durable. In general, the principle of res judicata bars re-
litigation of a claim already decided by courts. 
A standard rationale for these doctrines emphasizes the finality interest of the 
party who won the original decision (Westen, 1980:1033-5). That party, already 
having had to defend its position and having done so successfully, has a 
legitimate interest in seeing the legal challenge against him end once and for all. 
Another, economic-oriented, rationale suggests that by reducing the 
opportunity for future litigation these doctrines conserve litigation expense 
(Posner, 1998:635). Applying the framework of this paper suggests, however, 
that the added durability accorded to trial court decisions does not necessarily 
achieve these two goals.  
Before examining the implications of the analysis, consider the proper 
interpretation of the model. In a trial setting, what does the initial entitlement, 
W0, represent? One way to conceptualize an entitlement is to base it on the 
underlying substantive rules and facts surrounding the case and to identify the 
meritorious party as the entitlement holder. This approach is problematic as it 
embodies the idea that there exists one “correct” decision in the trial. It is also 
problematic because it would imply that if parties spend no litigation effort, the 
court must reach the correct decision. Alternatively, we can interpret W0 to 
represent the burden of proof presumptions. In a criminal proceeding, W0 is 
the presumption of innocence, namely, a defendant’s entitlement for zero 
punishment. According to this interpretation, the “rent-seeker” is the 
prosecution, trying to “chisel” away a punishment. If no litigation effort is 
32 Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal 
Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1001, 1033-5 (1980). 
33 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 635 (5th ed., 1998). 
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expended by the prosecution, the initial entitlement of zero punishment 
remains unscathed; and the more the prosecution spends, the higher will the 
punishment be.  
Viewing a trial as a rent-seeking contest with an initial entitlement of zero 
sanction for the defendant suggests that the prosecution or the plaintiff’s ability 
to extract a positive sanction depends on the assumptions regarding the 
effectiveness of litigation expenditures. Accordingly, which version of the 
model—and thus which of the propositions above—applies would depend, in 
part, on the merits of the case. In cases in which an innocent defendant can 
rebuke the prosecution’s case against her by spending sufficiently in defense 
(i.e., cases in which a1 is not prohibitive), the predictions of Sections 2.2 and 
2.3 will hold. That is, the most that the prosecution can extract from a 
defendant who can establish innocence is a punishment that is equivalent, in 
terms of disutility, to the cost of defense. The prosecution could tailor its 
“expropriation” either by reducing the severity of the charge, or by tuning its 
offer for a plea bargain. Alternatively, in cases in which the defendant cannot 
rebuke the prosecution’s case, the prosecution can extract a punishment in 
proportion to its investment of trial cost, and the prediction of Sections 2.4 
and 2.5 will hold.  
Thus, in situations in which the defendant can rebuke the case against her, 
several lessons can be derived from the analysis. Ex post, the defendant 
benefits from the added protection that a Durable regime such as double 
jeopardy provides. However, when trial decisions are known to be more 
durable, the ex ante effect is to make a favorable outcome more difficult to 
secure.34 Nevertheless, Proposition 1 implies the defendant will still be better 
off under the Durable regime, due to the saving in exogenous defense costs. A 
meritorious defendant benefits by not having to repeatedly defend her 
position. In a criminal procedure, some of the main costs of defense borne by 
the defendant are exogenous, and thus subject to this “saving.” In particular, 
34 In the context of doctrines like double jeopardy and collateral estoppel, several authors have 
recently recognized the effect of durability on the incentives of litigants to invest in affecting the 
outcome at trial. Posner (1998:636) was perhaps the first to acknowledge that a party “might 
expend disproportionate resources on the trial of an issue, anticipating benefits from being able 
to use the judgment in subsequent litigation.” The point was made in the early editions of 
Posner’s textbook. It was first modeled by Stephen Spurr (1991). In a recent thoughtful analysis 
of the double jeopardy doctrine, Vic. Khanna (2002:343) focuses on the ex ante effect arising 
from asymmetric appeal rights and concludes that double jeopardy, by inducing the prosecution 
to increase its spending at trial, might paradoxically increase the chance of defendant’s 
conviction--“Asymmetric appeal rights, by giving the prosecution only one shot at obtaining a 
conviction at the initial trial, may induce the prosecution to spend even more in the initial trial 
than if appeal rights were symmetric.” 
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each round of litigation involves high fixed costs for the defendant (costs that 
are independent of the actual litigation effort expended), such as the 
restrictions on her liberty, the requirement of presence in the proceedings, the 
discomfort of undergoing investigation, and the fear of the potential non-
pecuniary sanction, all of which are reduced if an acquittal is durable. To the 
extent that some defense costs are endogenous, Propositions 2 and 3 further 
suggest that the Durable regime might lead to either an increase or decrease in 
the trial-stage defense costs.  
Another type of durability that can be accorded to findings of fact at the trial 
phase is a reversal of presumptions. A revisable decision is one that is durable, 
unless successfully challenged. For example, the collateral estoppel doctrine 
extends the validity of a decision beyond the specific dispute in which it was 
adjudicated, to other disputes as well, and thus has the effect of shifting from a 
Periodic to a Revisable regime. Proposition 1 suggests that the only effect of 
this added durability is on the division of litigation effort across time, with 
more effort being concentrated at the first trial instance.35 Overall, though, the 
parties will devote as much litigation effort under the Revisable regime as 
under a Periodic regime, distributed differently over rounds. The bottom-line 
payoff to the “entitled party” (the party who, with sufficient expenditure, can 
prevail on the merits) would be unchanged.  
In cases in which the initial entitlement for zero sanction cannot be effectively 
defended (say, because the prosecution or the plaintiff are meritorious), the 
analysis in Section 2.4 and Proposition 4 applies. When the opposing party 
(say, the prosecution) can reduce the well-being of the defendant by increasing 
the prosecutorial effort, it has been shown that the Durable and the Revisable 
regime lead to the same exact outcome. Thus, even if the prosecution would be 
entitled to appeal an acquittal and could potentially reserve litigation resources 
towards such a contingency, the prosecution would rationally choose to 
concentrate all of its resources at the trial level and forgo the opportunity to 
revisit the trial outcome.36 As long as the return to litigation effort is at least as 
35 The effect of increased trial-stage effort under the Revisable regime might be diminished by 
resource constraints. If, say, a party cannot shift the potential second-stage litigation resources to 
the first trial (say, if the state reduces the prosecution budget that would otherwise be allocated 
to appeals), the ex ante effect would not fully materialize. This effect is suggested by Khanna 
(2002:384-85). 
36 Khanna (2002:364-68) suggests that if the prosecution were able to appeal acquittals, it 
would save some effort for possible appeal. The analysis here demonstrates that this strategy 
could only be rational under the questionable assumption that prosecutorial effort yields greater 
return in the appeal. 
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high at the trial stage,37 the only reason to reserve resources is in situations in 
which the outcome of the first trial is known to be inapplicable to future 
litigation (say, against third parties).38 The tendency to concentrate resource at 
the initial trial stage would be weaker for a party that expects future litigation 
effort to be more productive (say, if more favorable evidence is expected to 
become available, or if the decision making panel is expected to be favorably 
biased in the next round). In such cases, under a double jeopardy doctrine the 
prosecution effort must still be concentrated at initial-trial stage, whereas in the 
Revisable regime the litigation effort would in part be shifted to the later stage 
in which it may be more productive. 
Thus, the lesson the analysis draws is that in order to understand the effects 
of the durability-of-judgment doctrines, it is important to examine how such 
doctrines influence the decisions to optimally allocate litigation effort across 
the different stages of litigation. The ex post view that is prominent in the legal 
literature, emphasizing finality and the “period-2” effect of reduction in 
litigation cost, is less conclusive once complemented by the ex ante view which 
focuses on the “price,” in terms of legal expenditures, that would be required 
to obtain a favorable decision. It is the structure of litigation costs across 
periods, and not the finality of the judgment, that accounts for the parties’ 
preference for durability.  
3.4.THE DURABILITY OF ENTITLEMENTS IN PRIVATE LAW39
Legal entitlements may be more or less durable depending on the availability of 
enforcement measures when they are violated. But enforcement is costly and 
violations oftentimes pass unchallenged. Various legal doctrines deal with the 
effect of such under-protection. These doctrines determine if, and how quickly, 
the entitlement is lost due to lackluster enforcement. A landowner who does 
not take quick action against a person occupying or otherwise using her land 
might lose her rights through an adverse possession or prescription doctrine. 
An intellectual property right holder who does not enforce against an ongoing 
infringement might be barred from future enforcement through the doctrines 
of estoppel and laches. A contractual promisee might be unable to enforce an 
explicit contractual term if she has acquiesced in course of performance to a 
37 The return to prosecutorial effort would be greater at the trial, relative to the appeal, stage 
because of the decay of evidence, the availability of more highly skilled defense attorneys 
specializing in appeals, and the cognitive tendency of decision makers to align with previous 
decisions.  
38 See Spurr (1991) analyzing the effect of future potential litigation against third parties on the 
incentives to spend at the initial trial. 
39 This section builds on Ben-Shahar, "The Erosion of Rights By Past Breach" (1999). 
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practice departing from the explicit contract. These and other similar “erosion 
of rights” doctrines are rules of durability: the more quickly the right can expire 
when under-enforced, the less durable it is. 
Commentators have traditionally viewed these erosion doctrines as beneficial 
to violators and disadvantageous to rightholders. The logic of this view owes to 
the ex post perspective: other things equal, rightholders would prefer to have 
more durable entitlements and a lesser risk of erosion. In the area of contract 
law in particular, erosion doctrines have been rationalized as promoting 
flexibility. Again, other things being equal, an ongoing practice between the 
parties indicates their intent better than the “historical” document of 
agreement. Lisa Bernstein (1996) was perhaps the first to note, in the 
contractual context, that other things are not equal. Highlighting the ex ante 
effect of the course of performance doctrine, Bernstein discovered that the less 
durable the contractual right, the more strict will the rightholder be in guarding 
against violations of that right. With this greater motivation to guard the 
entitlement against breach, the rightholder’s threat to enforce becomes more 
credible, thereby reducing—rather than increasing—the value that 
opportunistic violators can chisel. 
The framework developed in this paper can help determine under what 
conditions a rightholder will suffer from the lesser durability that an erosion 
doctrine introduces. Within the model, an erosion rule is equivalent to a 
Revisable Allocation regime, since an early-period violation, if not contested, 
erodes the entitlement. The alternative regime, which does not permit rights to 
erode, is equivalent to a Periodic Allocation regime, since an early-period 
violation, even if not contested, does not change the entitlement at the late 
periods. Proposition 1 demonstrates that either rule generates the same level of 
utility for the entitlement holder (although they differ with respect to the 
distribution of value over time.) It also shows that the infringing party is better 
off under the erosion regime. Proposition 4 shows that only if the rightholder’s 
defense cost is prohibitive will she be worse off under the erosion rule. 
3.5.THE DURABILITY OF MARRIAGE
The following is a highly concise version of how the methodology in this 
article can be used in the context of marriage decisions. Since the decision to 
marry is greatly influenced by factors that are not captured in the rational 
choice model, the framework here is, of course, of limited application. Still, in 
the aggregate, it may describe marginal incentives. 
Consider an asymmetric interaction between “partners,” in which one partner 
(party B) is “dependent” on the other (party A) in some way and would thus 
benefit from its support—monetary, emotional, raising children, and the like. 
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Suppose that, within a marriage relationship, party B is entitled to this support 
and party A must provide it; and that party A cannot, while in the marriage 
relationship, cease the support nor search for different partnerships which may 
be more valuable for party A.  
A Periodic regime is one in which marriage can be terminated without 
liability, at any time; thus, in every new period party A can decide either to 
remain in the relationship and continue to support B, or to leave. A Revisable 
regime is one in which marriage can be terminated, but only at a cost to party 
A. For example, a “for cause” divorce regime or any practice in which the one-
sided dissolution of a relationship by party A is impossible, but rather a 
dissolution needs to be approved and can potentially be opposed by party B, 
fits the Revisable regime template. A Durable regime is one in which the 
marriage cannot be terminated—a no-divorce regime—or can be terminated 
only with party A having to continue to support B. 
From party A’s perspective, a Durable marriage regime limits his ability to 
walk away. Valuing this entitlement and recognizing that a decision to marry 
would forfeit it, party A will be more hesitant to enter the marriage. He would 
wait longer to acquire more reliable information about the quality of the match, 
and would forgo marriage more often. Party B would be less likely to extract 
the commitment from party A, when this commitment is durable. The absence 
of an “exit” option reduces the incidence of entry into the relationship. And 
conversely, a Periodic regime, while reducing the value of the relationship for 
party B, makes the relationship more likely to emerge in the first place. Thus, a 
less durable marriage is not necessarily worse for B, in fact, it may make B 
better off. 
Thus, within the framework of this analysis (and recognizing, again, that it 
only captures one aspect of marital relationships), it is not the legal durability of 
marriage that determines how much marital support party B would enjoy: the 
more value B gets from A, the harder it is to secure. Rather, the well-being of B 
depends on the transactions costs of entering and exiting from marriages and 
how these costs are affected by the marriage and divorce doctrine. If, say, it is 
disproportionately costly to acquire information about the long-term 
propensities of party B and how valuable the marriage would be in the more 
remote future, a durable regime could potentially reduce the incidence of 
marriage by more than it increases the term of those marriages that do occur. 
4.CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper aims to capture a broad phenomenon that appears in various 
unrelated areas, the durability of legal allocation decisions. The analysis was 
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conducted rigorously, providing the benefit of generality and abstraction, but 
also hiding the nuances of the various applications. The discussion of various 
legal contexts illustrated the types of situations to which the analysis can be 
applied. What is left for this concluding remark is to state what this paper in not
about. 
The analysis of this paper focuses on the durability of allocation decisions. 
Allocation decisions are contests which the law, through various unrelated 
branches, referees. By restricting attention to allocation decisions, the paper 
explicitly ignores other types of legal decisions that might also be evaluated 
with respect to their durability–productive and other non-zero sum contests. 
Thus, in simplistic terms, the paper is interested in the durability of the division 
of the fixed-size pie, not in the durability of the production of a bigger pie. If a 
battery is made more durable due to improvements in technology, added 
durability may not cost more and consumers would clearly prefer the more 
durable batteries. 
Thus, the analysis applies only to legal contests that have the zero-sum 
characteristic. A legislative process that creates winners without creating 
identifiable losers (say, when the budget can be increased) would not, then, fall 
within the scope of this analysis. Similarly, the analysis does not directly apply 
to the issue of durability of intellectual property rights. By setting the length of 
the rights, their durability is determined. However, this durability feature is 
known to affect the size of the pie, namely, the incentives to create value ex 
ante. Thus, it is not merely a distributive decision. Also, while it is clear that an 
innovator is better-off ex post the more durable the protection, it is not clear 
which party is worse off in a way that may lead it to object to the legal 
protection more vigorously. It is only when competing innovators are more 
likely to challenge the validity of the alleged innovation or more likely to 
preempt it in a way that would significantly reduce the likelihood of acquiring 
legal recognition of the innovation, that the effect highlighted by the analysis in 
this paper, that durability does not necessarily benefit the beneficiary of the 
allocation, would hold. 
The analysis throughout this paper has not examined how durability rules and 
norms emerge. These rules and norms are often the product of a legal process 
that itself can be more or less durable. Thus, for example, a legal transition 
norm, which determines the durability of rules, can itself be more or less 
durable; the rules of divorce which determine the durability of marriages can, 
and every once in a while are, altered; statutory limitation periods, which 
determine the durability of entitlements, can be extended or shortened; and the 
like. Similarly, to the extent that durability of rules depends on the incentives of 
legislators to repeal previous enactments, these incentives might change over 
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time as a result of factors like changed personnel in Congress and shifts in the 
public attitude towards a captured legislature. Whether or not the lessons this 
article draws regarding the durability of allocation decisions also apply to the 
durability of durability rules, is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. 
The main step in the proof is to show that yDUR < yPER. Consider the following 
equation: 
m a(y)  by = 0 
Denote by y(m) the solution to this equation. Notice that y(1) = yPER, namely, 
yPER is the solution to this equation for m = 1; similarly, y(½) = yDUR, namely, 
yDUR is the solution to this equation for m = (½). The concavity assumption 
regarding a(y) implies that ma(y)  by < 0 for all y > y(m), which can be stated 
as follows: For every y in the vicinity of y(m), 
m a'(y)  b < 0. 
To determine the slope of y(m), total differentiate the equation defining y(m)  
w.r.t m: 
a(y) ma' (y) dydm b
dy
dm 0+  =
yielding: 
dy
dm
ay(m)
b ma' 0=  >
Thus, y(1) > y(½), or: yPER > yDUR. Q.E.D 
Proof of Proposition 3. Under the Periodic regime, at each period party B expects 
that, for any level of zt he spends, he will be able to subsequently extract b 1
b

at(zt). That is, once at(zt) is determined, party B can expect to extract this value, 
less the cost involved in doing so, a cost of yt = at(zt)/b. The net payoff to 
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party B is thus b 1
b
 at(zt)  zt (see Table 1). The level of zt that maximizes this 
payoff, denoted by ztPER, satisfies: 
at' (ztPER) = b 1
b
 .
Under the Durable regime, for any level of z1 that he chooses, party B 
expects a net payoff of 2b 1
2b
 a1(z1)  z1. The level of z1 that maximizes this 
payoff, denoted by z1DUR, satisfies:  
a1' (z1DUR) = 2b 1
2b

Under the Revisable regime, the period 1 investment will equal z1DUR and the 
period 2 investment will equal ztPER.
Because b 1
b
 > 2b 1
2b
 for all b>1, it follows that a1' (z1PER) > a1' (z1DUR). The 
assumption that a1' ' <0 implies that z1PER < z1DUR. Thus, a1(z1PER) < a1(z1DUR).  
From Proposition 1, we know that UAPER = 2W0  (a1(z1PER) + a2(z2PER)) and 
that UADUR = 2W0  a1(z1DUR).  Because a1 under the Durable regime is greater 
than a1 under the Periodic regime (but not necessarily greater than a1 + a2), the 
comparison between UAPER and UADUR is ambiguous. In particular, for 
sufficiently high values of a1(z1DUR), the entitlement holder’s utility under the 
Durable regime may be lower than her utility under the Periodic regime.
 Q.E.D. 
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